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Introduction 
In his book, Why do Muslims Rebel?, Mohammed Hafez cautions that, “Western responses to 
Islamist violence must be measured and well thought out. Misconstruing the underlying causes of 
Islamist rage or overacting to Islamist violence may only intensify militancy, not temperate it.”[1] 
For policy-makers, understanding the source or cause of discontent serves as the best hope to 
remedy the ills that lie beneath what some refer to as “sacred” terrorism or religious terrorism. Yet 
a basic question is what would extremists hope to achieve by resorting to such violent acts? Is 
terrorism ever rational? Can terrorism be deterred? All too often, our analysis of extremist motives 
begins with our reaction to the terrorist act itself. However, for certain extremist organizations, 
channeling efforts to identify and isolate the root cause for such events requires a deeper 
understanding of the intricacies that foment such profound actions, specifically suicide terrorism 
and the use of a weapon of mass destruction.  
In a recent review by Jeff Goodwin of Jessica Stern’s Terror in the Name of God, he stated that 
few studies probe deeply into the cause of terrorism and, as a result, “it remains a mystery. A 
contributing factor is that social movement scholars with very few exceptions have said little about 
terrorism. Nor have they paid sustained attention to the more general question of how movement 
organizations make strategic choices, of which terrorism is one.”[2] To resolve group level 
problems we need to view it from a group level or movement level perspective. It is at that point 
that we can start crafting more tailored solutions to counter the extremist threat. The central 
theme of this essay is to examine the rational behind terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. 
Here, I compare Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda to analyze to what extent their actions were the 
result of strategic choice or group behavior.  
In brief, Aum Shinrikyo’s decision to attack civilians on a Japanese subway reflects an 
organization in a desperate fight for survival. According to Martha Crenshaw’s organizational 
perspective, “terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, and unpredictable” and terrorist 
acts occur as a result of internal group dynamics.[3] The group’s ultimate decision to strike a 
Tokyo subway system was as much an attack on Japan’s political culture as it was an act by a 
desperate group. In contrast, al Qaeda’s methodical planning and extensive preparation reflects 
an instrumental approach where the act of terrorism is that of strategic choice founded on the 
basis of collective values. According to Crenshaw, such an organization ultimately fails when the 
group is unable to reach its political objectives or when the cost of conducting such terrorist acts 
exceeds any foreseeable benefits.  
Aum Shinrikyo  
Today, evolving before us is the fear of continued acts of “megaterrorism” such as the use of a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Authors such as Graham Allison, Bruce Hoffman, Walter 
Laqueur, and others have written about the prospects of such actions. In fact, Thomas Schelling 
in 1979 wrote that “Sometime in the 1980s an organization that is not a national government may 
acquire a few nuclear weapons…. By ‘organization’ I mean a political movement , a government in 
exile, a separatist or secessionist party, a military rebellion, adventurers from the underground or 
the underworld, or even some group of people merely bent on showing that it can be done.”[4] 
Through his description, Schelling argues that distinctions exist between terrorist groups. If 
terrorist groups are distinctive in their motives, it would stand to reason that in order to deter or 
influence such organizations, one must also be able to isolate and differentiate the group’s goals 
and objectives from their rhetoric. For example, in comparing the Japanese terrorist cult Aum 
Shinrikyo to al Qaeda, we find distinctions in orientation and ideology, yet both are often 
characterized by the use of religious extremism to serve ideological objectives.  
Before the events of 9/11, Aum Shinrikyo unleashed fears of extreme terror with the release of 
sarin gas in a Japanese subway in 1995. Led by a religious mystic, Shoko Asahara, followers of 
the movement had come to believe that “Armageddon will come at the end of this century 
and…only a merciful, godly race will survive. The leader of this race will emerge in Japan.”[5] 
Asahara, characterized as charismatic, highly ambitious individual, methodically built a cult that, 
at its peak, reached 40,000 members world-wide with an estimated 30,000 followers in Russia 
and other areas to include Australia, Sri Lanka, and the United States.[6] The group capitalized 
on millennial visions and apocalyptic predictions to frame their group’s doctrine which was deeply 
influenced by the works of Nostradamus; his work serves as a cornerstone of the group’s 
teachings.[7] Aum’s followers actively recruited students and professionals in the fields of 
medicine, science, computers, engineering, and other technical areas. Asahara’s charisma and 
message seemed to have a great appeal to many who felt alienated by the industrialized, secular, 
and conformist aspects of Japanese society.[8]  
At its peak, it is estimated that Aum Shinrikyo’s worth was as much as $1.5 billion.[9] With such 
great financial resources, Aum Shinrikyo invested capital to support high-tech, state-of-the-art 
laboratories and funded its own research circumventing restrictions normally associated with 
larger corporate research laboratories.[10] In addition to collecting monies through donations, 
tithing, and sales of religious materials, Aum conducted seminars and courses in the cult’s 
teachings charging hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars to participate in these sessions. In 
fact, Aum Shinrikyo diversified its enterprises by running a chain of restaurants in Tokyo as well 
as owning a computer manufacturing firm that assembled and sold computers in Japan with parts 
imported from Taiwan.[11] Other more surreptitious practices included the manufacturing of illegal 
drugs that was supported by the Japanese mafia (the Yakuza) with a marketing agreement. 
Further, Aum engaged in a practice referred to as “green mail” where Aum would extort 
community leaders by threatening to establish a “branch” office or school within their local 
community. By engaging in such practices, the cult succeeded in gaining leverage through 
extortion, coercion, theft, and murder as a form of fund-raising for the cult.[12]  
Asahara and his closet followers planned to defend themselves against the coming Armageddon 
by creating a formidable arsenal that would enable Aum Shinrikyo to survive and become the 
most powerful group in the world. Despite high expectations and several attempts at local 
elections, Asahara and other leaders failed to gain a seat in the Japanese parliament. The result 
seemed to have radicalized the core leaders even more resulting from unmet expectations and 
the group’s goals in changing Japanese political culture. He would later preach that it was “the 
duty of Aum members to hasten Armageddon” and subsequent efforts to attack the Japanese 
legislature also were indicative of Aum’s disappointments with the democratic system.[13]  
While the group’s most notorious act involved the release of sarin gas, Aum attempted to acquire 
various types of other weapons to include biological, nuclear, and radiological material. The cult’s 
close relationship with followers in Russia positioned Aum Shinrikyo to leverage its vast wealth, 
contacts with Russian security forces, and dealers in the black-market yet failed to acquire 
weapons-grade fissile material.[14] Aum remained open to all alternatives but ultimately chose to 
pursue the chemical option and made several attempts with limited results between 1990 through 
1995 leading up to the attack of the Japanese subway in Tokyo. Asahara and his core leaders 
would soon discover that days prior to the subway attack, local authorities and law enforcement 
personnel had plans to conduct police raids against cult facilities and offices. By March 20, 1995, 
Aum’s leaders believed that the only strategy that remained was a pre-emptive attack to strike 
fear as a last act in order to ensure the group’s survival. Despite having limited success in its 
previous efforts with chemical agents, Aum had believed that a successful attack would have 
sufficient psychological impact as to allow the group to exist. In the end, what remains clear is 
that Aum displayed a great deal of resolve in its effort to employ tactics that would cause mass-
casualties.[15]  
The perceived response by Japanese authorities compels Asahara and his inner circle to go 
further underground. From Aum’s perspective, this act improved the cult’s chances for survival 
while reducing the likelihood of death or capture, particularly among the group’s leaders. Going 
underground isolates the movement from the outside world limiting the opportunity to add new 
recruits or re-replenish losses. Additionally, this action has the added effect of further radicalizing 
the group’s tactics and ideology. As a result, terrorist behavior begins to reflect the internal 
dynamics of the organization rather than achieving a specific strategic objective.[16] The group 
begins to develop a tight identity, social connections, and interpersonal bonds that a sense of 
cohesion. It intensifies the groups resolve to move towards more violent activity.[17] The 
organization’s decision-making begins to reflect the group’s internal dynamics and group think 
eliminates decision within the leadership’s inner core. Loyalty to the peer group takes on a more 
profound meaning and an important motive as activists shift towards a deepening commitment to 
the cause.[18] Survival is at stake and the group becomes more willing to use extreme violence to 
counter any threat to its existence.  
Within the context of Aum’s value system, the cult’s actions appear logical. Aum felt cornered and 
that their last option for its survival was to strike back with its weapon. Despite previous failures, 
the group had committed itself to developing and using chemical toxins as their primary 
instrument of extreme violence. As a self-legitimizing organization, Aum had rejected Japanese 
society and believed it had no other option but to confront authority. Its survival was at stake. One 
can argue that Aum sought an indirect approach to counter society’s overwhelming 
preponderance of military and law enforcement forces by resorting to indirect methods. In failing 
to reach its goal of achieving political power through legitimate means, the group’s leadership 
decided that a pre-emptive strike was their best and only option.  
Al-Qaeda  
Similarly, one can draw parallels between Osama bin Laden and the development of antisystem 
frames used by al Qaeda to provide ethical justification for violence against civilians. For example, 
on February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden released his Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, 
where he states his three major grievances with the United States; first, the occupation of “the 
lands of Islam in the holiest places, the Arabian peninsula”; the second, “the crusader-Zionist 
alliance”; the third, “to fragment all the (Arab) states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee 
Israel’s survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the peninsula.”[19] 
Released by the World Islamic Front, this fatwa “became the manifesto of the full-fledged global 
Salafi jihad” allowing the jihad to carry “the fight to the ‘far enemy.’”[20]  
By tapping into a view supported by a broad public, bin Laden attempts to draw support from 
among the greater Muslim community. His message strives to appeal to a wider global audience 
and rally a Muslim population of over one billion people to al Qaeda’s cause. His effort is intended 
to reduce the psychological cost of participating in a radical cause or terrorist organization. In an 
article by della Porta, the author states that “The ideology of the terrorist organizations offered (1) 
a justification of political violence, including murder; (2) an image of the external world that 
masked the failures of the armed struggle; and (3) a positive evaluation of the role of individual 
action.”[21] Similar to Aum, al Qaeda has drawn from those sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s cause. Bin 
Laden has leveraged common cultural frames and religious ones to serve as part of the group’s 
strategic ideological objectives. Therefore, as with Aum Shinrikyo, one must distinguish and 
separate between religious and ideological factors that shape the group’s short-term and long-
term objectives.  
Unlike Aum, however, al Qaeda’s influence has extended to groups with known or alleged 
connections to al Qaeda including the Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore; 
Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya in Egypt; Harakat ul-Maujahidin in Pakistan; 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia; Jaish-e-Mohammed in India and Pakistan; 
and, al-Jihad in Egypt.[22] But the distinction between al Qaeda and its regional surrogate groups 
differ in that al Qaeda possesses a global view whereas the concerns by these various groups 
are more local. Likewise, these local groups have gone to considerable lengths to justify their 
support to the local population and would be less inclined towards resorting to mass violence. 
While they may agree that an attack on the United States is justified, a similar response locally 
would be counterproductive to the group’s cause. Yet, to the extent that these corollary groups 
support al Qaeda directly or through more passive means, knowledge and understanding of the 
overall network is critical to determining the groups’ vulnerabilities and potential opportunities to 
influence, deny, degrade, or disrupt threats of extreme violence.  
Arguably, in the case of a group like al Qaeda, the framing of such religious zeal serves a useful 
purpose to promote the group’s ideological objectives as well as justifying the use of collective 
violence.[23] According to Hafez, “Muslims rebel because they encounter an ill-fated combination 
of political and institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and reactive and indiscriminate repression 
on the other. When states do not provide their Islamist opposition movements opportunities for 
institutional participation, and employ repression indiscriminately against these movements after 
a period of prior mobilization, Islamist will most probably rebel.”[ 24] Hafez describes how radical 
Islamists organize themselves and demand strict ideological and behavioral adherence of each of 
their members. In a similar way, Aum used threat, fear, murder, and intimidation to mitigate 
dissention within the group. This radicalized view, however, further isolates the organization from 
the rest of society.  
The increased radicalization produces a “spiral of encapsulation” that gradually isolates Islamists 
rebels from the broader movement. Such extremism increases moral justification for its cause 
while inducing a separation from the greater society. To be successful “Organizers of violence 
must align their tactics with cultural norms, symbols, and ethics that give moral meaning to acts of 
violence. Culture provides a “tool kit” of concepts, myths, and symbols from which militant 
organizations could selectively draw to construct strategies of action.”[25] However, if a society 
places a premium on such sacrifice, cultural framing can succeed in intensifying and reinforcing 
extreme use of violence such as suicide terrorism. Thus, martyrdom and suicide terror becomes 
the weapon of choice for producing mass violence. Academics would argue that mass terror, like 
suicide terrorism, serves a strategic purpose and is considered a coercive tool by terrorist 
organizations. While nation-states apply the threat of economic sanctions and conventional 
firepower as a means of coercion, terrorists increasingly use suicide terror as the instrument of 
choice.[26]  
Unlike Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda used a technologically conservative weapon combined with 
variants on a familiar tactic of hijacking, bombing, and martyrdom as suicide terror.[27] Yet, like 
Aum, al Qaeda expressed a strong interest and effort in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. 
Long before Bin Laden’s 2003 fatwa, “the global jihadist network have made their desire for 
nuclear weapons for use against the United States and explicit, by both word and deed. Bin 
Laden has called the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) a ‘religious duty.’”[28] 
Ayman al Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) expands bin Laden’s views by 
stating that the objective of the global jihad against the United States and its allies is to:  
1. To inflict maximum casualties against the opponent;  
2. To concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way of 
inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the Mujahedin in terms of 
casualties;  
3. Targets as well as the type and method of weapons used must be chosen to have an 
impact on the structure of the enemy;  
4. To reiterate that focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be feasible at this 
stage.[29]  
As reported in The New York Times , bin Laden’s group, like Aum, sought to build a nuclear-yield 
weapon. After a few attempts, bin Laden’s organization fell victim to scams by vendors in an effort 
to acquire weapons-grade material.[30] The inability to acquire the necessary fissile material is 
likely to have convinced al Qaeda planners to shift its focus to chemical agents as a possible 
weapon of choice. However, as demonstrated by the multiple failed attempts by Aum, 
successfully executing a chemical attack is not a simple task. In a conversation with Dr. David 
Rapoport, he stated that he believes the use of chemical weapons is less likely due to the 
historical difficulty in weaponizing and delivering a chemical attack.[31] As al Qaeda training 
videos surfaced in August 2002, the public at large became convinced of the group’s motivation, 
desire, and intent to using chemical and biological toxins if given the opportunity.[32] In the wake 
of 9/11, the idea never seemed more plausible, yet al Qaeda displayed a very pragmatic 
approach in resorting to a strategy that seemed tried and true. To al Qaeda, history had shown 
that suicide terrorism is a highly effective asymmetric weapon that could yield results.  
In a recent article, Robert Pape proffers five key observations on how terrorist organizations have 
assessed the effectiveness of suicide attacks and the limits of their coercive ability. First, he 
states that suicide terrorism is strategic. He asserts that the majority of suicide attacks occur as 
part of an organized group’s activities in support of a broader strategic framework to support a 
particular goal. Second, the suicide terrorism is geared to forcing democracies to give ground on 
nationalistic causes. Third, he states that “during the past twenty years, suicide terrorism has 
been steadily rising because terrorists have learned that it pays.” Suicide terrorists sought to 
compel American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave 
Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995. 
Following this logic, the Madrid Bombings which occurred three days before a nation wide 
general election, resulted in the death of 192 civilians. The dramatic events had an immediate 
impact on the Spanish elections and subsequent withdrawal of Spain’s troops in Iraq. Published 
reports would later reveal the al Qaeda had identified Spain as a key target in their overall 
strategic plan. The belief was that Spain was “very vulnerable to attacks, primarily because public 
opposition to the war is total, and the government is virtually alone on this issue.”[33]  
Pape believes that “although moderate suicide terrorism led to moderate concessions, these 
more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns are not likely to achieve still greater gains and may 
well fail completely.”[34] States may choose to abandon or concede short-term goals in lieu of 
any major concessions. Decisions that would have long term implications such as compromising 
the state’s overall security, significant loss of territory, or economic deprivation would be unlikely. 
Secondly, the “most promising way to contain suicide terrorism is to reduce terrorists’ confidence 
in their ability to carry out such attacks on the target society.”[35] In essence, terrorists resort to 
suicide terrorism because on some level it works. As a strategy, martyrdom and mass violence 
gives hope to the extremist cause and the historical precedence is indicative that at some level, 
success can be achieved through the use of extremist violence. By focusing solely on the 
prevention of a similar attack, we do so at the expense of understanding the root cause and 
motives that led to the violent attack in the first place. Concentrating our energies as to why and 
how organizations resort to extremism requires an analysis of how and why groups employ 
terrorism.  
Strategic Choice or Group Behavior  
Martha Crenshaw emphasizes the importance of analyzing how terrorist groups behave as a key 
process in developing effective policy recommendations.[36] She develops two approaches to 
better understand terrorism and its consequences. The first approach argues that terrorism 
represents a strategic choice from a set of possible alternatives by a political actor. Behaving on a 
set of collective values, an organization may choose terrorism to achieve radical political and 
social change. This instrumental approach is viewed as a response to government behavior and 
actions. The corresponding view is that as cost for conducting such activity increases or as the 
reward for such actions decreases, violence will be less likely to occur. The instrumental 
perspective takes a basic rational approach of cost/benefit analysis in choosing terrorism. The 
second approach emphasizes the internal organizational process within a particular group or 
across similar groups who have common objectives. The emphasis is on the internal dynamics of 
a group where leaders offer incentives to individuals or control their actions to discourage 
defection of dissent within the organization and foster intense loyalty. In effect, the actions of this 
type of group may not correspond to the organization’s stated political objectives and more 
reflective of an erratic organization displaying unpredictable behavior showing more of a struggle 
of survival rather than activity that supports ideological objectives. Such a group would be more 
inclined to change internal incentives towards individuals in response to perceived threats from 
external pressures applied to the organization.  
How then would this apply to the Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda? We shall first compare the 
similarities of both organizations.  
Table 1: Similarities between Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda 
Similarities 
· Amassed a great deal of wealth and financial resources  
· Global reach and access to external funds & support  
· Strong interest and pursuit of WMD: well resourced/strong desires  
· Expressed political objectives and a call for change  
· Followers influenced by charismatic leadership  
· Discouraged by the state apparatus and desire for radical change  
· Operated within “permissive” environments  
· Followers were not of one specific class or social strata  
· Displayed ability to adapt and leverage existing technology  
With regards to weapons of mass destruction, the most telling comparison is the desire and 
financial resources to pursue chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Both 
organizations believed that violence can achieve political change and both believed in the 
possibility that terrorism was an effective means to that end. However, as we compare the 
differences between both organizations, we begin to draw distinctions in their decision-making 
that reflects Crenshaw’s original supposition regarding instrumental and organizational 
approaches.  
Table 2: Differences between Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda  
Differences   
Aum Shinrikyo  Al Qaeda  
· Manufactured/synthetic belief 
system  
· Utilized pre-existing cultural 
and religious frames  
· Used a chemical/biological weapons · Achieved an effect similar to a WMD  
· Concentrated on WMD despite 
failures  
· Abandoned WMD & adapted 
modified proven tactics  
· Attacked from within  · Attacked from afar  
· Reacting to pending strike  
· Comprised of members from 
an exiled community (Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, etc.)  
· Remained in country of origin 
primarily  
· Relied on networked strategy 
to achieve effect  
· Relied on internal technical 
knowledge & expertise for WMD 
programs  
· Sought external support for 
WMD develop  
· Sought to mine & manufacture 
fissile material  
· Demands on revamping the 
political system and secular 
construct  
· Ran for political office and lost  
  
Drawing from these conclusions, we begin to see the contrast between the organizations. While 
Aum expresses political change as their ultimate desire, its decision-making reflects more of an 
organizational survivalist construct in achieving its ends. Unlike al Qaeda, Aum becomes focused 
in using a weapon of terror to achieve its objectives. This obsessive fixation continues despite 
numerous experimental attempts and failures. Aum’s leaders appear almost unconstrained by 
their own ego and driven to validate its extensive investment in research and equipment by using 
chemical weapons. In contrast, al Qaeda abandons its effort only after repeated attempts failed to 
achieve desired outcomes leading the group to instead modify known capabilities, bombing, and 
hijacking, with the intent to improve their chances of success. In keeping with a more instrumental 
approach, al Qaeda maintains its focus on accomplishing its operational objective despite the 
specific tactical means of doing so. Although al Qaeda had the wealth, resources, and contacts 
necessary for such a venture its leaders decided to pursue other alternatives to achieve the 
desired effect. However, what both examples show is that despite wealth and connections 
problems still exist in pursuing weapons of mass destruction.  
A second key observation is the difference in how each organization frames its cause. Al Qaeda 
leveraged existing sentiments and feelings shared among a large majority of the Muslim world. 
The leadership within al Qaeda drew upon widely shared beliefs that roots of the Muslim world’s 
problem lies with the continuing influence of the West in Islamic affairs. His message had a broad 
appeal because it resonates with existing cultural, religious, and societal beliefs. Al Qaeda’s 
leaders hijacked existing beliefs to satisfy ideological objectives. In contrast, Aum’s belief core is 
wholly manufactured, synthetic in its origins. First, while Asahara dabbled in the practices of 
Hinduism, its belief structure was pieced together from various religious and non-religious beliefs, 
such as the writing of Nostradamus. Second, unlike life in a predominantly Islamic culture, Aum 
Shinrikyo’s teachings were not necessarily reinforced by everyday surroundings, societal contacts, 
and interactions. Unless a follower of Aum lived on one of its communities, individuals were 
susceptible to external influences. To some degree, this constraint contributed to need for 
suppressing dissention within the group.  
Conclusion  
The likelihood of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the post-9/11 era remains 
unclear. However, the scale of attack on 9/11 suggests that despite the technical challenges, 
groups will continue to expend efforts in possessing a capacity to cause extreme violence 
whether through conventional or unconventional means. As Dr. McAdam suggests, more effort 
and dialogue between academic and government communities is necessary to understand the 
role of extremism and source of contention behind groups that may spawn from social 
movements.[37] This would help policy-makers identify and distinguish groups who approach 
terrorism from an organizational or instrumental perspective.  
Pressures applied to a group dominated by internal dynamics would compel the organization to 
implode by isolating the particular individual goals versus political ideology. This is best 
exemplified in the discussion of Aum Shinrikyo above. Within the context of Aum’s value system, 
the cult’s actions appeared logical. Their rejection of Japanese society is best illustrated in their 
response to pending raids by Japanese authorities. In lieu of achieve political power through 
legitimate means, the group ultimately sought to achieve its objective through extreme violence. 
In contrast, a group choosing terrorism among other alternatives will calculate actions based on 
perceived benefits and costs. This approach would suggest that presenting a set of different 
alternatives as substitutes or increasing costs to the degree that any benefits gained by terrorist 
in using extreme violence would not be sufficient to achieving political objectives. In the case of al 
Qaeda, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was simply a part of the range of options 
available for instrumental purposes. Aum’s obsession with WMD technology combined with the 
permissive environment of Japanese legal system enabled Asahara’s followers to pursue WMD 
technology despite numerous failed experiments. Today, changes in the legal system and law 
enforcement techniques would make the duplication of Aum’s extensive WMD apparatus more 
difficult. In other words, the changes adopted by Japan’s legal system and experience gained 
from Asahara and his cult have raised the cost of pursuing such tactics, thus mitigating any desire 
to replicate Aum’s program in Japan.  
In light of 9/11 and for groups who follow al Qaeda, an attack using chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear weapons has yet to be seen. The potential is undeniable. Technical 
challenges will remain an issue in the short-run which will make conventional weapons applied in 
an asymmetric approach a primary means to cause mass disruption. As a result, the long-term 
goal should be continued emphasis on enforcing constraints and controls on the proliferation of 
sensitive materials to include commercially available fissile matter and not solely weapons -grade 
material. Experts contend that a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb”, a 
combination of both conventional explosives with low grade radiological material, is a greater 
threat than a nuclear weapon.[38] However, future terrorist groups may examine both cases a 
draw from them the next most probable course of action. For example, where Aum failed to hire 
the expertise necessary for a nuclear weapon’s program, would an instrumentalist group like al 
Qaeda stand a better chance of recruiting Islamic extremists with the requisite skills? Secondly, 
some argue that Islamist groups like al Qaeda are on their way out. If this is the case, what would 
preclude a group from following Aum Shinrikyo’s model of resorting to extreme violence with the 
use of a more catastrophic weapon? In either case, the goal should be eliminating a terrorist’s 
hope for success, shoring up defenses, and deterring the proliferation of WMD technology. 
Eliminate the means and we reduce the likelihood of a mass attack. Likewise, by understanding 
the problem we increase the probability of mitigating potential extremist growth while reducing the 
seeds of future threats.  
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